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INTRODUCTION 
In the last decade, cognitive-behavioral theories of d~pression 
have increasingly incorporated both cognitive and environmental par-
ameters to account for the complex symptomology present in depressive 
disorders. These theories place primary emphasis on the role of cog-
nitions in determining emotions; that is, one's beliefs about events 
are seen as central to depressive emotions. Considerable research 
supports these contentions. 
Recent research by Bower (1981) provides additional data con-
earning the relationship between emotion and cognition. Bower suggests 
that emotion serves as a memory uni~ that enters into associations 
with coincident events. Activation of this emotion aids in retrieval 
of events associated with it and prime themes for other cognitive 
. 
processes. In the group of studies associated with this theory, Bower 
has obtained significant results relating hypnotically-induced emotions 
and cognitive processes. 
While Bower's research has significant implications for theories 
of depression, two questions arise from this research. The first 
concerns demand compliances resulting from the hypnotic manipulations. 
Although Bower has defended this criticism with related research, 
additional studies should be carried out. A second question is related 
to the generalizability of Bower's results. The generalizability of 
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these results may be evidenced if research in naturalistic settings 
also found a relationship between emotions and cognitive processes. 
partial replications in normal or clinical settings using subjects 
with naturally-occurring emotions might adequately demonstrate the 
relevance of Bower's findings. With this in mind, Gundersen (Note 1) 
demonstrated a relationship between affect and cognitions while study-
ing various degrees of unmanipulated (naturally-occurring) depression 
in a normal college population. The present study was designed to 
expand further upon Bower's research and clarify the relationship be-
tween affect and cognitions in a clinical setting. Specifically, the 
relationship of depression to: the content of affect-laden word 
recall, ratings of affect-laden stimuli, the amount of total recall, 
the amount and affect of interjections, the ordering of recall, and 
associations to neutral words were observed. 
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REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
Introduction 
Philosophers have related affect and cognitions for 2000 years. 
Kant suggested that reason synthesizes experiences according to its 
own nature and our understanding of the outside world is possible only 
in terms of our modes of perception. Kant's philosophy maintained that 
the laws of man determined what laws of nature can be discovered. 
Dynamic theorists have also addressed the issue of the relationship 
between affect and cognitions for nearly 90 years (James, 1890; 
McDougall, 1921). In the last decade cognition and affect have again 
become major areas of theory and research in depression following 
several years of inactivity due tp the popularity of strict behaviorism 
and its extreme stimulus-response approach. One reason some researchers 
have returned to studying cognition is that many responses are not 
predictable from the stimulus situation alone. Cognitive events inter-
vene between the two to sufficiently warrant attention. In this short 
time, some theorists have come to view affective states from both 
operant and cognitive terms. 
The following sections will be devoted to contemporary theories 
and relevant issues about depression as viewed by cognitive-behavioral 
researchers. First, three ways of classifying depression will be de-
fined. Next, an extended view of the cognitive determinants of depres-
sion will be presented. Regarding this theme, several researchers have 
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proposed that depressed people interpret their world and themselves 
differently than nondepressives (Beck, 1972; Ferster, 1974; Rehm, Note 
2; Seligman, 1975). Recent research by Bower (1981) suggests that 
emotions powerfully influence specific cognitive processes through an 
associative network process. 
In summary, this review intends to show the increasing use of 
cognitive explanations to depressive behavior. Specific attention 
will be given to research relating depression to selective attention, 
memory, and associations. 
Classifying Depression 
4 
Researchers classify and define depression in a variety of ways 
from a simple mood state to a complex syndrome consisting of behavioral, 
cognitive, affective, and physiological parameters (Becker, 1974). In 
general, these classifications fall into three groups (Roth, 1977): 
a) qualitative classifications, b) dimensional or trait classifications, 
and c) cognitive-behavioral classifications. 
The first group of classifications consists of theorists who 
have adopted a symptom cluster model and propose "qualitatively" dis-
tinct types of depression. Types of depression are differentiated on 
the basis of symptomology, etiology, response to treatment and back-
ground factors (age, family history, etc.). In the past, one of the 
most frequently used nosological systems was the American Psychiatric 
Association Diagnostic Criteria (DSM II, 1968). The seven affective 
syndromes cited were: psychiatric depressive reaction, manic depression-
5 
depressed type; manic depression-manic type; manic depression-circu-
lar type; involutional depression, neurotic depressive reactions, and 
cyclothymic personality. Each subtype was differentiated from the 
other on the basis of etiological and/or symptomatic factors. For 
instance, both psychotic and neurotic depressive reactions were thought 
to be precipitated by environmental stresses while the remaining sub-
types were related to physiological constitutional, and genetic 
variables. Similarly, manic-depressive patterns were discriminated 
from involutional-depression on the basis of past symptoms, and from 
cyclothymia on the basis of symptom severity. 
Recently, the diagnostic criteria were revised (DSM III, 1980). 
The revision lists the following affective disorders: major depression, 
single episode; major depression, recurrent; bi-polar disorder, mixed; 
bi-polar disorder, manic; bi-polar disorder, depressed; cyclothymic; 
and depressive neurosis. Each subtype is differentiated from the other 
on the basis of three axes: clinical syndromes, personality and devel-
opmental disorders, and physical disorders and conditions. In addition 
to those distinctions, a clinician can also use two additional axes to 
supplement diagnoses: severity of psychosocial stressors and highest 
level of adaptive functioning in the past year. 
Another proponent of the qualitative classification of depres-
sions is Winokur and his associates (1970) who have differentiated 
subtypes of depression in terms of depressive symptoms and the presence 
of other psychiatric disorders. He has made distinctions between grief 
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reactions, primary affective disturbance and secondary affective dis-
turbance. A grief reaction is considered a loss induced, transient 
depressive episode. A diagnosis of primary affective reaction is given 
if the client has no other psychiatric disorder, and secondary affective 
reaction is indicated when a preexisting psychiatric dysfunction was 
evident. Winokur further divides primary affective reactions into 
unipolar subgroups along a similar line of thinking. 
Another type of qualitative classification of depression is em-
ployed through sophisticated statistical instruments. Cluster analyses 
(Everitt, 1972) and factor analytic procedures (Fleiss, Lawlor, Platman, 
& Fieve, 1971) have been used to isolate qualitatively distinct types 
and subtypes of depression. Grinker, Miller, Sabashin, Nunn, and 
Nunally (1961) performed one of the earliest factor analytic studies 
of depression. The resulting types were: empty depression, angry 
depression, hypochondriacal depression, and anxiety depression. Fried-
man, Cowitz, Cohen and Granick (1963) isolated subtypes similar to that 
of Grinker et al. (1961). 
The second group of classifications conceptualizing depression 
is a family of disorders, each of which differs with regard to the 
severity or intensity of experienced symptomology. This type of class-
ification is called the "dimensional" or "trait" conceptualization of 
depression. Unlike type theorists, a trait theorist does not view 
depression as encompassing a variety of qualitatively distinct syndromes. 
Distinct syndromes may exist but they are viewed as being reduceable to 
7 
a finite number of common dimensions in which individual differences 
are best represented as gradations along a single dimension (unidi-
mensional system), or along a combination of several dimensions (multi-
dimensional system). A second assumption of this approach to class-
ification is that the nature of the depression has a basic underlying 
feature, that is, a client is seen as "generally depressed." It is 
also assumed that the depression is a covariation of one or more of 
discrete symptoms (or traits) which are obtained by conventional 
factor analytic procedures. In essence, a trait is an artificial 
entity which is defined by factoring group data rather than by 
individual case. Since a trait is independent, a high score on one 
gives a researcher little or no information about an individual's 
remaining traits. Variation in blends among the basic traits accounts 
for the variability of clinical depressions (Rosenthal & Gudeman, 
1967). 
A variety of unidimensional systems has been derived. For 
example, Klerman (1971) and Zubin and Fleiss (1971) state that psychotic 
and neurotic depressions are not qualitatively distinct and only differ 
in regard to symptom intensity. Similarly, Kendell (1968) and Kendell 
and Gourlay (1970) suggest that the traditional endogenous-reactive 
dichotomy (Harmilton & White, 1959; Kiloh & Garside, 1963) may instead 
be symptom clusters occupying opposing ends of a single depressive 
trait. 
Multidimensional trait systems are common in the field. The 
8 
variety may in part be attributed to use of different subject popula-
tions (inpatient, outpatient~ college students) and different measures 
of depression (MMPI-D, Beck Depression Inventory, Multiple. Depression 
Inventory). The common theme contained in all these multidimensional 
systems is that underlying all depressive states is a "general" depres-
sive disorder containing several "group" or "specific" factors. 
Perhaps the most investigated multidimensional system is that of 
endogenous-reactive depression. Traditionally, reactive depression 
was thought to be environmentally precipitated while endogenous de-
pression was linked to internal physiological causes. Trait theorists 
have reported symptomatic differences. For instance, Kiloh and Garside 
(1963) evaluated 92 clinically diagnosed "endogenous" or "reactive" 
subjects on 35 measures (age, previous attacks, etc.). Two factors 
accounted for a large portion of the variance, a "general" depression 
factor and a bi-polar factor related to the endogenous-reactive dichot-
omy. Specific symptoms such as self-pity, existence of a precipitant, 
inadequacy, initial insomnia, depression worse in the morning, agita-
tion, obsessions, hypochondriacal complaints, etc. were related to the 
reactive end of the dimension. Other symptoms such as early morning 
awakening, depression worse in the evening; onset in fourth decade of 
life, etc. were loaded on the endogenous end of the dimension. Similar 
patterns have been found by other researchers (Carney, Roth, & Garside, 
1965; Hamilton & White, 1959; Kiloh, Andrews, Nielson, & Bianchi, 1972; 
Hendels & Cochrane, 1968). 
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The third major way of classifying depression does so in terms 
of the frequency of occurrence of specific behaviors, thoughts, and 
physiological symptoms. This is referred to as the cognitive-behavioral 
classification of depression. These theorists assume that no two de-
pressions are identical; each comprise a unique set of deficits and 
excesses. No assumptions are made about covariation among depressive 
symptoms. That is, the appearance of one symptom does not suggest cer-
tain others are expected. Ferster (1973, 1974) was one of the first 
behaviorists to advance this position when he viewed depression as 
involving a reduced frequency of "adjustive behaviors," an increased 
frequency of avoidance and escape responses, and a passive behavioral 
mode of controlling one's environment. Variations of the basic behav-
ioral framework attributing varying degrees of importance to the cog-
nitive component in depression have been advanced by a number of other 
researchers (Beck, 1972; Rehm, 1977; Seligman, 1974, 1975; Williams, 
Barlow, & Agros, 1972). It is important to note that all of the 
theories in this classification of depression in some way implicate 
cognitions. In some, the cognitive alterations are viewed as symptoms 
while in others they are central to depression. The following sections 
will be devoted to contemporary cognitive-behavioral theories providing 
frameworks from which one can explain both overt-motoric symptomology 
and verbal-cognitive symptomology. Both environmental and cognitive 
parameters are considered causal factors. 
Cognitive-Behavioral Hodels of Depression 
This section is an elaboration of the previously described 
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"cognitive-behavioral" classification of depression. As stated before, 
theories in this classification of depression incorporate both environ-
mental and cognitive factors of causality to different degrees. First, 
theories heavily weighing the environmental causes of depression will 
be reviewed. The remaining cognitive-behavioral theories of depression 
will be reviewed in order of increasing prominence of the cognitive 
factor. 
Behavioral Perspectives. A number of theorists have suggested 
that depression is related to an insufficient amount of reinforcement 
(Coyne, 1976; Ferster, 1974; Lazarus, 1968; Lewinsohn, 1974, 1975; 
Liberman & Raskin, 1971). Lewinsohn and his colleagues (1974) have 
developed a model of depression which best represents this viewpoint. 
Classical and operant conditioning processes are both involved in their 
framework. Specifically, a low rate of response-contingent reinforce-
ments acts as an unconditional stimulus eliciting a variety of depres-
sive symptoms (verbal statements of dysphoria, self-depreciation, 
rejection, guilt, fatigue, sleeplessness, loss of appetite, headaches, 
etc.). Once elicited, these symptoms are maintained in an operant 
fashion through social reinforcement (sympathy) . A low rate of rein-
forcement places the depressed person on an extinction schedule. Other 
depressive response patterns are subsequently developed and maintained, 
i.e., the behaviors cause the depressed person to be avoided, the in-
dividual receives less reinforcement, and continues to behave in 
depressed ways. 
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Lewinsohn (1974) argues that obtained reinforcement is a function 
of: (a) the number of events which an individual finds potentially 
reinforcing; (b) the number of potential reinforcers available; ·and 
(c) the individual's ability to obtain available reinforcers. Lewin-
sohn has primarily examined the relationship between depression and low 
rates of response-contingent positive reinforcement. The differential 
amounts of reinforcement which depressed clients and their families 
obtain has been systematically evaluated. Using a verbal interaction 
coding system, Lewinsohn and Shaw (1969) found that a minimal amount of 
time was spent discussing topics which were reinforcing to the de-
pressed client relative to the time spent on topics reinforcing to 
the spouse. Similar results were found in a number of naturalistic 
settings (Lewinsohn & Atwood, 1969; Lewinsohn & Shaffer, 1971; Martin, 
Weinstein, & Lewinsohn, Note 3). 
In more rigorously controlled investigations, the emphasis re-
mained on the covariation of mood and reinforcing activity. Lewinsohn 
and Libet (1972) examined depressed patients, nondepressed psychiatric 
controls, and normal controls and found a significant correlation be-
tween their mood (Depression Adjective Checklist, 1965) and the number 
of pleasant activities in which they engaged (MacPhillany and Lewinsohn 
Pleasant Events Schedule, 1971). The results of this study were repli-
cated by Lewinsohn and Graf (1973). In a similar procedure, MacPhillany 
and Lewinsohn (1974) found that depressives reported distinct types of 
activities over the same period as controls. When all subjects rated 
the Pleasant Events Schedule items in terms of the reinforcing value, 
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depressives' ratings were significantly lower than those of nondepres-
sives. This supports Lewinsohn's contention that depressives experience 
fewer events or activities as potentially reinforcing. 
Other researchers have reported findings to support this frame-
work. Wener and Rehm (1975) found that individuals receiving low 
levels of reinforcement became more depressed than individuals receiv-
ing high amounts of reinforcement. Hersen, Eisler, Alford and Agras 
(1973), Lazarus (1968), Liberman and Raskin (1971), and McLean, Ogston, 
and Grauer (1973) have reported that they have treated clients with low 
levels of reinforcement. Improvement in all of these cases was corre-
lated with obtaining more reinforcement. Finally, a number of inves-
tigators have found depression to covary with the occurrence of "life 
stressors" (events which a behaviorist would designate as losses of 
actual or potential reinforcement). Paykel, Meyers, Dienelt, Klerman, 
Lindenthal, and Pepper (1969) found that within the six-month period 
prior to interviews, depressives experienced significantly more losses 
(marital, occupational, social, familial, etc.) than the controls. The 
results were essentially replicated by Leff, Roatch, and Bunney (1970) 
who examined endogenous and non-endogenous inpatients. 
Lewinsohn has suggested that inadequate social skills may partial-
ly account for the depressive's infrequent receipt of reinforcement. 
This relationship has been-assessed in group (Lewinsohn, Weinstein, & 
Alper, 1970; Libet & tewinsohn, 1973), familial (Shaffer & Lewinsohn, 
Note 4), and laboratory contexts (Rosenberry, Weiss, & Lewinsohn, Note 
13 
5; Stewart, Note 6). Several findings emerged. Rosenberry et al. 
(Note 5) found that depressed subjects were less predictable and homo-
genous in emitting rapport-inducing and supportive communications. 
Libet and Lewinsohn (1973) found that depressives ~ngage in fewer activ-
ities, emit proportionately less reinforcers, communicate with a more 
restricted range of individuals, and take a longer time to respond to 
a verbalization. Stewart (Note 6) also found depressives to react 
slower to verbal and non-verbal prompts than nondepressives. 
All together, rather extensive data has been collected to support 
Lewinsohn's hypothesis that depression is linked to low rates of 
response-contingent positive reinforcement. However, this model is 
unable to account for all the complexities of depressive responses. In 
particular it can be argued that depression is not directly related to 
low rates of reinforcement but instead to cognitive processes which 
mediate between the activity and the cognitive symptomology (Rush, 
Khatami, & Beck, 1975). It could also be that depressives do not attend 
to or remember pleasant events and are minimally affected by their occur-
rence. These possibilities will be studied in a later section. 
A second theoretical perspective which strongly weighs the envir-
onmental component in depression is exemplified by Ferster (1966, 1973, 
1974). Ferster's conceptual position on depression appears to be a 
link between the environmentally and cognitively oriented theories. 
Coming from a radical behaviorist persuasion, Ferster studied both 
descriptive and functional aspects of depression. The description of 
depressive disorders is seen as consisting of both behavioral deficits 
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and excesses. Deficits are defined as a reduced frequency of normal 
activities. "Frequency reduction" refers to rate and quantity alter-
ations as well as occurrence and nonoccurrence of certain behaviors. 
Behavioral excesses are related to deficit conditions, for instance when 
a compulsive activity appears when normal problem solving behaviors 
are no longer emitted. 
Functionally, depression is assumed to be related to loss of 
important discriminative stimuli, certain reinforcement schedules, 
aversive environmental influences, and cognitive distortions. More 
specifically, Ferster contends that depression is apt to be precipitated 
by the loss of a source of reinforcement or stimuli leading one to emit 
positive behaviors (death of a spouse, loss of a friend, moving to 
another city, change of job, etc.). Lazarus (1968) suggested that the 
outcome of such a loss is related to the individual's overall availa-
bility of reinforcers. 
Ferster also saw certain intermittent schedules of reinforcement 
as precipitants of depressive reactions. From animal studies, certain 
fixed schedules of reinforcement providing small gains for a large be-
havioral expenditure results in a lower rate of responding. The lowest 
rate of behavior is seen immediately after reinforcement is adminis-
tered. 
Depressed individuals often spend a great deal of effort in avoid-
ing being punished by decreasing engagement in aversive behaviors. 
Ferster (1973) suggests that this decreased behavior leads to further 
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depression since "it commits such a large part of a person's repertoire 
to activities that do not produce positive reinforcement" (p. 867). 
Ferster (1973, 1974) goes beyond a strict stimulus-response ex-
planation of depression, however, to suggest that the individual's 
perception of the world affects his receiving of reinforcement. More 
specifically, he speculates that the depressive has a limited view of 
the world and has difficulty discriminating among different environ-
mental stimuli. Because of these discrimination difficulties, the 
depressive is apt to emit a response inappropriate to the situation and 
be punished. An example might be that a depressive considers home, 
work, and a party all appropriate places to engage in depressive be-
haviors. People at a gala party may consider his behavior strange, 
avoid the individual, and shut off another source of reinforcement. 
Only partially recognizing that punishment is contingent on the inappro-
priate behavior, the depressive acquires a "lousy view of the world" 
(Ferster, 1973, 1974). The environment is thought of as providing 
limited support, pleasure, and much distress and unhappiness. 
In summary, both Lewinsohn and Ferster espouse behavioral theories 
of depression. Ferster's approach has to a greater extent than Lewin-
sohn's attempted to relate depression to both cognitive and environmental 
parameters. He suggests that a one-to-one relationship between environ-
mental stimuli and depressive response does not exist and one must take 
into account the non-observable cognitive processes which mediate. 
Cognitive-Behavioral Perspective. On the basis of small animal 
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analogue research, Seligman and his colleagues have developed a cogni-
tive model of reactive depression in humans. The major construct 
utilized by this group is called "learned helplessness." Learned help-
lessness views depression as resulting from cognitions of response-
outcome independence, that is, beliefs that consequences are indepen-
dent of behavior. 
Recently, Abramson, Seligman, and Teasdale (1978) reformulated 
the learned helplessness model of depression. The reformulation recog-
nizes the importance of attributions in predicting reactions to uncon-
trollable outcomes. Attributions, i.e., explanations for events, may 
be stable or unstable, global or specific, and internal or external 
attributions of cause. The type of attribution chosen influences 
whether the future helplessness will be chronic or acute, broad or 
narrow, and whether helplessness will lower self-esteem or not. Selig-
man further stated that individual differences in attributional style 
probably exist and those who typically attribute failure to global, 
stable and internal factors are most prone to general and chronic 
helplessness depressions with low self-esteem. 
Two pieces of research are particularly relevant in highlighting 
the role of cognitive factors in the development of learned helplessness 
patterns of behaviors. Hirota and Seligman (1975) found that uncontrol-
lable experiences on a motoric task adversely affected performance on a 
cognitive task and vice-versa. The transfer of learned helplessness 
experiences is seen as providing support for cognitions concerning 
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response-reinforcement independence. Additional support for the cogni-
tive interpretation comes from research directly manipulating the 
instructional set {Hirota, 1974; Miller & Seligman, 1973, 1975). In 
particular, performance on a task was found to vary according to 
whether a subject was informed that the outcome is related to chance or 
skill. Similar effects are found for a chance instructional set and an 
actual helplessness experience (Hirota, 1974). Again, these are taken 
as support of mediating cognitions. In the instructional set paradigm 
the subject is "given" the cognitive pattern while in the actual 
learned helplessness situation the cognition is "learned" or "created" 
by the subject. 
Additional research has shown that the cognitive changes produced 
in learned helplessness experiences are accompanied by a host of be-
havioral response patterns. First, helpless subjects behave less 
aggressively and less competitively than non-helpless subjects (Maier, 
Anderson, & Liberman, 1972; Powell & Creer, 1969). Passivity andre-
tarded associativity are more prominent after time (Overmier, 1968; 
Overmier & Seligman, 1967). Also, uncontrollable traumatic experiences 
are thought to precipitate some physical and physiological dysfunctions. 
Weight loss, anorexia and norephineprine depletion have all been cited 
(Miller & Weiss, 1969; Weiss, 1968; Weiss, Stone, & Harrell, 1970). 
Seligman draws parallels between learned helplessness and depres-
sion in areas of etiology and symptomology. Symptomatically, Seligman 
(1974) only draws parallels to reactive depressions consisting of: 
passivity, negative expectations, lack of aggression, dissipation in 
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time, and also parallels weight loss, anorexia, and norephinephrine 
depletion. The etiology of a depressive episode is like learned help-
lessness in that it is highlighted by the uncontrollability of rein-
forcement (Teasdale, 1978). The cognitions need not be accurate (Selig-
man, 1974,1975). Aging, death of a loved one, and loss of a job are 
considered precipitants of depression in that they limit one's control 
over the environment or lead one to believe that control does not exist. 
Seligman has also addressed the issues of prevention and treatment 
of learned helplessness. In the past, treatment was seen as exposing 
the helpless subject to situations'in which the outcome is controllable 
(Klein & Seligman, 1976; Seligman, Maier, & Geer, 1968; Seligman, Rosel-
lini & Kozak, 1975). Prevention, on the other hand, was seen as a his-
tory of reinforcement contingent upon one's actions (Seligman, 1975; 
Seligman & Groves, 1970; Seligman & Maier, 1967). So, the prevention 
and antidote of helplessness seemed to be the demonstrated helpfulness 
of one's actions. As a result of the reformulation, researchers pre-
sently suggest a variety of prevention and treatment suggestions. 
Therapists can aid depressed individuals by helping them to change the 
estimated probability of aversive outcome, to change the expectation 
from uncontrollability to controllability, or to change their attribu-
tions for success or failure. Abramson et al. (1978) have suggested 
specific ways these suggestions can be implemented. 
For Seligman the goal is the development of personal "competency" 
cognitions. Individuals must believe they are generally able to control 
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their environment. Klein and Seligman (1976) reported that success on 
a simple discrimination problem had a therapeutic effect on depressed 
subjects' performance and beliefs of control. Response-contingent 
reinforcement is expected to help prevent depression (Seligman, 1974, 
1975). 
In summary, Seligman has developed a theory of depression sup-
ported by extensive research. He has argued that while environmental 
factors cause the emission of depressive behaviors, they are mediated 
and probably secondary to the influence of cognitive factors. An 
interesting question arises here, especially for those subjects with 
the attributional style that typically attributes failure to global, 
stable, and internal factors. Why do depressives with this attribu-
tional style not concentrate on their positive control experiences? 
Perhaps their depressive moods tend to cause them to associate to other 
depressive situations. It is also possible that their recall of positive 
contingent reinforcement situations is poor. 
Cognitive Perspectives. One of the most well-known exponents of 
the cognitive view is Beck (1967, 1970, 1974). Beck argues that de-
pression should not be conceptualized as an affective disorder; but 
rather, as a cognitive disorder. The primary symptom of depression is 
the cognitive triad which refers to an organized system of negative 
evaluations of oneself, one's future, and the environment. Low self-
esteem, thoughts of incompetency and inadequacy, poor body image, 
thoughts of impending distress, and perceptions of environmental hurdles 
were all examples of the depressive's cognitive set. Behavioral and 
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affective symptoms are seen as consequences to the depressed cognitions. 
Research conducted by Beck has been twofold. The development of a 
self-report ·test of depression (Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 
1961) and a helplessness scale (Beck, Weissman, Lester, & Trexler, 
1974) were the first focus of attention. In addition, Beck has 
attempted to support his contention that depressives have a negative 
view of themselves, their future and their environment. Research has 
shown that depressives dream significantly more about themes of depri-
vation, rejection, depreciation, self-injury, distorted body image, 
etc., than do nondepressives (Beck & Hurvick, 1959; Beck & Ward,. 1961). 
Similarly, depressives' earliest recollections have more themes of 
rejection than those of nondepressives (Beck & Ward, 1961). Depressed • 
individuals are more likely to identify with a pictorial character who 
has had an unpleasant experience than a character who has avoided such 
an experience or had a pleasant experience (Beck, 1967). Beck (1972) 
also reports that depressives are apt to down-grade their positive 
attributes when asked to compare them with their peers. Finally, de-
pressed subjects exhibited weaker self-reference recall than normals 
suggesting they may describe themselves inconsistently (Davis, 1979). 
All these studies support Beck's contention that depressives have a 
negative view of themselves, their future, and their environment. 
Davis' study (1979) may additionally suggest differential recall between 
depressives and normals. 
In summary, Beck has developed a theory of depression which clear-
ly emphasizes the role played by cognitive factors and deemphasizes the 
relative importance of environmental parameters. An important part of 
Beck's research seems to be the distinction between the nominal and 
the actual antecedent to depressive behavior. In essence, cognitions 
about rather than physical stimuli often determine the course of one's 
behavior. 
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Rehm and coworkers have developed another cognitive theory of 
depression which is based on a modified version of Kanfer's self-control 
model (Kanfer, 1970a, 1970b, 1971; Kanfer & Karoly, 1972). Although 
this model has been used as a method for achieving behavioral change, 
in this context it will aid in explaining the occurrence of a variety 
of depressive symptoms. In particular, depressive behaviors are seen 
as arising from maladaptive self-control patterns. Kanfer has argued 
that behavior is maintained and altered by subject mediated regulatory 
processes as well as the environment. Self-regulation consists of three 
basic sequentially ordered operations: self-monitoring, self-evaluation, 
and self-reinforcement. Each of these will be described and its rela-
tionship to depression presented. 
The first component of Kaufer's model involves self-monitoring. 
Both internal and external stimulus and response events can be monitored. 
Motoric responses such as running, studying, hair pulling, etc., all fall 
into this category. Covert responses such as thoughts, imagery, and 
sensations like auditory hallucinations (Rutner & Bugle, 1969), obses-
sional thoughts (Mahoney, 1974), and critical self statements (Hannum, 
Thoreson, & Hubbard, 1974) can be monitored. 
In relating self-monitoring processes to depression, a high fre-
quency of negative verbalizations and a low frequency of potentially 
enjoyable behaviors can be suggested. Rehm (1977) argues that depres-
sives· have two such deficits. First, they attend to negative rather 
than positive events. Second, depressives are thought to give their 
attention to immediate effects of their behavior rather than to its 
long-term consequences. 
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With regard to the first notion, Beck (1972) has proposed a simi-
lar mechanism to account for cognitive distortions, namely that de-
pressed individuals are seen as selectively abstracting the unpleasant 
aspects of their experiences. A number of studies provide suggestive 
support for this concept. Pluchtick, Platman, and Fieve (1970) have 
examined the relationship between depression, ideal self-concept, and 
actual self-concept. Depression was found to correlate with negative 
actual self-concept rather than an altered ideal self-concept. One might 
speculate that this is a result of selective attention and memory from 
actual positive events toward actual negative events. Roth (1977) re-
searched this hypothesis and although he did not find support for 
differential memory of positive and negative adjectives, he did find 
evidence of differential selective attention. Relative to nondepres-
sives, depressed subjects monitored significantly more of their own 
negative and significantly fewer positive behaviors. Furthermore, it 
was postulated that procedural parameters may have precluded the demon-
stration of recall differences. 
Cognitive distortions seen in depressives' self-monitoring may 
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occur because depressives "expect the worst." Friedman (1964) reported 
that while depressives and nondepressives performed equally well on a 
number of tasks, the depressive expected to do worse. Similarly, Miller 
and Seligman (1973), Klein and Seligman (1976), and Guza (1979) found 
that depressed persons had lower expectancies of success than nonde-
pressed persons on laboratory tasks. Beck (1972) also suggested that 
depressives are likely to entertain negative future oriented cognitions. 
With this research supporting such negative self~onitoring it is easy 
to imagine why depressives may not look at the long-term consequences 
of their behavior. Some studies suggest that when they do look at 
longer range consequences, depressives then ruminate about the delayed 
detrimental effects of their behavior (Beck, 1972; Schless, Schwartz, 
Goetz, & Mendels, 1974; Seligman, 1975). 
The second component of Kanfer's model is the self-evaluatory 
process. Monitored responses are evaluated against an internal criter-
ion. Performance may fall above or below this standard. Rehm (1977) 
hypothesizes two maladaptive patterns of self-evaluation. First, de-
pressed individuals often make inaccurate attributions of causality. 
Second, the depressive is likely to have stringent evaluative criteria. 
With regard to attribution, Rehm argues that depressives ascribe 
negative events to internal factors and positive events to external 
factors. For instance, a bad performance on a task would be due to 
personal inability while a good performance on the same task due to 
luck. Miller and Seligman (1973) arguing for the independence of re-
sponding and reinforcement, reported that depressives had lower 
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expectancies regarding the likelihood of future successes after behaving 
successfully than did nondepressives. The same finding has been repli-
cated in two other studies (Klein & Seligman, 1976; Miller & Seligman, 
1975). One might infer the subjects attributed their success to exter-
nal factors. In addition to research support for external attributions, 
Guza (1979) reported the depressives were more likely to make attribu-
tions in an internal direction following feedback of failure at a task. 
Rehm (1977) also proposed that depressives employ a stringent 
self-evaluative criteria. Rehm states the evaluative criteria for de-
pressed people may be characterized by a high threshold for "excellence" 
and a low threshold for "failure." Similar notions have been offered 
by behavioral theorists (Bandura, 1971; Marston, 1965) and neo-analytic 
theorists (Melges & Bowlby, 1969). Common to all these perspectives 
is the theme that the depressed person has unreachable and unrealistic 
goals and standards. Investigations (Golin & Terrell, Note 7; Murdock-
Kitt, Note 8) have substantiated that depressed students tend to set 
higher goal levels than did nondepressed students. In addition, thera-
pists have reported anecdotally that depressed patients may employ 
overly high criteria to evaluate their behavior (Bandura, 1971). All 
in all, studies support the hypothesis of depressed subjects having 
stringent self-evaluations. 
Some of the self-evaluation research suggests a differential 
recall component contributing to the stringent self-evaluations of de-
pressives. DeMonbreun and Craighead (1977) and Nelson and Craighead 
(1977) reported depressed subjects recalled less positive and more 
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negative feedback than controls at high levels of reinforcement. Nel-
son et al. (1977) also reported that depressed subjects accurately 
recalled negative reinforcement while normals underestimated the same. 
These studies suggest that emotional state may be related to the con-
tent of an individual's recall, specifically mood may be related to 
recall of mood-congruous material. 
The final stage of the self-control chain involves self-rein-
forcement. ·Contingent self-reward and self-punishment enables an 
individual to increase or decrease certain response patterns. The 
effect of self-reinforcement on associated behaviors has been extensively 
reviewed by Thoreson and Mahoney (1974) and Mahoney and Thoreson (1974). 
Rehm (1977) postulates that depression is characterized by high rates 
of self-punishment and low rates of self-reward. 
Support for the contention that depression is associated with 
maladaptive self-reinforcement is obtained from three studies. When 
subjects were told to reward themselves if they thought they were cor-
rect, not reinforce themselves when they were unsure of their responses, 
or punish themselves if they thought they were incorrect, Rozensky, 
Rehm, Pry, and Roth (Note 9) found that depressed patients administered 
more self-punishments and fewer rewards than nondepressed patients or 
normal control patients. The groups did not differ with regard to 
actual correct responses. Roth, Rehm, and Rozensky (Note 10), who par-
tially replicated this study, found that depressed college students 
emitted significantly more self-punishments than nondepressed college 
students. Nelson and Craighead (1977) also report depressed subjects 
self-reinforcing less than controls but did not find different rates 
of self-punishment. In general, studies support that reinforcement 
is related to more stringent requirements in depressed individuals. 
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Behavioral passivity is often cited as a core symptom of depres-
sion. Many behaviorists argue that retarded movements, infrequent 
participation in previously reinforcing activities, etc. are related 
to a lack of external reinforcement (Ferster, 1974; Lazarus, 1968; 
Lewinsohn, 1974). Self-control literature suggests that self-adminis-
tered and externally administered reinforcements are equally able to 
maintain behavior patterns (Roth, 1977). 
Summary. Five theories of depression were described. All these 
theories of depression implicated cognition in some manner. Lewinsohn 
and Ferster suggest that the role of cognition in depression, if it 
exists at all, is merely a symptom resulting from environmental influ-
ences. Seligman proposes that cognition plays a more important role in 
depression. A cognition of learned helplessness, as a result of re-
sponse-outcome inconsistency, becomes a mind-set through which future 
behaviors are affected. 
Beck and Rehm are the strongest advocates of the cognitive deter-
minant in depressive behavior. Both theorists suggest that cognitions 
are central to depression rather than merely symptoms of depression. 
Beck's main premise states that cognitions about stimuli rather than the 
physical stimuli determine the course of an individual's behavior. Rehm 
has developed a theory in which depressives' self-monitoring, 
self-evaluation, and self-reinforcement differ from normals. Research 
suggests that self-evaluation and possibly self-monitoring may be 
affected by differential recall. 
Bower's Research on Cognition and Emotion 
Recently, Bower, a cognitive psychologist, presented several 
studies concerning the relationship between mood and cognitive pro-
cesses (1981). Bower's work adds supporting data and a somewhat dif-
ferent perspective to the previously discussed cognitive theories of 
depression. Whereas cognitive theories view affect as resulting from 
cognitions, Bower introduced affect to aid in understanding memory and 
cognition. 
Theoretically, Bower approaches the relationship between depres-
sion and cognitive processes from a strong cognitive perspective. 
Still the importance of emotions playing a causal role in behavior is 
illustrated by his associative network theory of emotional behavior. 
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"In this theory, emotion serves as a memory unit that can enter into 
associations with coincident events. Activation of this emotion unit 
aids in retrieval of events associated with it •.• " (p. 129). An 
emotion can also prime themes for other cognitive processes such as free 
associations, interpretation of ambiguous material, perceptual organiza-
tions, etc. 
Three major areas of study have been focused on by Bower. In all 
cases, research has primarily been done on subjects in which happy or 
sad moods have been induced hypnotically. One area of study concerns 
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mood-state-dependent memory. In a representative study (Bower, 1981), 
subjects learned two lists of words, one while happy and one while sad. 
Then they were asked to free recall the original list while either in 
the same or opposite mood. Controls who learned both lists and free 
recalled all in the same mood were also included. Compared to the 
controls, state-dependency appeared in better recall in the same-mood 
list and worse recall in the opposite-mood list. Emotional mood was 
a helpful feature in distinguishing target material from interferring 
material. State-dependent effects were also found in subjects remember-
ing personal and childhood experiences. That is, people remembered a 
greater percent of experiences that were affectively congruent to the 
mood they were in during recall. 
A second area researched by Bower is that of emotion's powerful 
influences on cognitive processes such as free associations, fantasies, 
social perceptions and snap judgments about others. For example, Bower 
(1981) demonstrated that mood significantly influenced the interpreta-
tion of ambiguous scenes from TAT cards. This finding is consistent with 
the research of Roth and Rehm (1980) demonstrating that mood biased cat-
egories areused in interpreting ambiguous interpersonal scenes. Clin-
ically depressed subjects rated their interview behavior as having 
significantly more negative and unskilled behaviors than nondepressed 
subjects. This also agrees with Rehm's (1977) hypothesis that depres-
sives self-monitor their own behaviors more negatively than nondepres-
sives. Bower, Forgas, and Krantz (cited in Bower, 1981) partially 
replicated this experiment on college students hypnotized to feel either 
socially competent or incompetent. Students feeling socially incompe-
tent rated their behaviors more negatively than students hypnotized to 
feel socially competent. 
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People's moods also had powerful effects on free associations they 
gave to neutral words (Bower, 1981). Hypnotized subjects generated 
chained associates to five words when they were happy and to another 
five words when they were angry. The criterion used to determine 
whether the associations were influenced by mood was the judges' ability 
to correctly differentiate the affective state of the individual who 
made the associations. When blind judges evaluated whether the chain 
showed "happiness" or "anger" or "can't decide," they judged anger 
accurately 83% of the time and happiness 73% of the time, significant 
at the .01 level. Fisher and Marrow (1934) used hypnosis-induced moods 
and Madigan and Ballenbach (Note 11) used moods induced by the Velton 
procedure with much the same results. 
The associative network theory also implies mood affects snap 
judgments of people or objects. Isen, Shalker, Clark and Karp (1978) 
found subjects gave more positive ratings on mock consumer surveys when 
they were feeling good after receiving a gift. Bower (1981) found sub-
jects' thumbnail sketches of others were affected by their happy or 
angry moods. It is suggested that current mood activates and primes 
mood-congruent categories into readiness and these are used to assimi-
late and classify ambiguous experiences. 
The third area of study which Bower reviewed and researched is 
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that of salience of mood-congruous material. That is, people attend to 
and remember information which is emotionally salient to their mood. 
Bower gave two examples of subjects showing lower recognition thres-
holds for emotionally salient material. Clore (cited in Bower, 1981) 
found that happy and angry subjects responded quicker and with fewer 
errors to mood-salient material. Postman and Brown (1952) reported 
lower recognition thresholds (less bright exposures needed) for 
successes-versus-failure words for subjects who had just experienced 
success or failure in an unrelated task. 
Research also shows evidence of mood-salient memory. In one ex-
periment (Bower, Gilligan,.& Monteiro, 1981), subjects were made happy 
or sad by post-hypnotic suggestion and read a balanced third person 
account of two people, one who was happy--everything was going well, 
and one who was sad--everything was going wrong. Subjects were found 
to identify with the mood-salient character and reported that this 
character was the central one in the story. The next day while in a 
neutral mood subjects recalled more facts about the character who 
exhibited the same mood they had felt the day before. Because they 
were in a neutral mood at the time of recall, this was a mood-congruous 
learning effect. In another experiment (Bower et al., 1981) subjects 
were induced to feel happy or sad by post-hypnotic suggestions and read 
about one character who related an unrelated series of happy or sad 
incidents. Subjects reportedly remember more incidents related with 
their mood. Happy readers recalled one and one half as many happy 
incidents as sad incidents and sad readers recalled one and one third 
as many sad as happy incidents. So, the mood contiguity effects seem 
to affect learning or memory. 
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In summary, Bower has investigated the effects of mood and cog-
nitive process in terms of a network theory. Using primarily hypno-
tized subjects, Bower reported three major findings. First, he 
reported a strong mood-state-dependent effect on memory. Secondly, he 
suggested that emotions affect cognitive processes such as free assoc-
iation by assimilating and categorizing mood congruent categories into 
readiness. Lastly, Bower reported evidence in which learning or memory 
for mood-congruous material is higher than for mood-discordant material. 
Bower's findings have.strong implications for the cognitive 
theories of depression. Bower's approach agrees with their basic 
premise that cognitions are central to depression. In addition, this 
research extends cognitive models of depression by investigating the 
relationship between emotions and cognitive processes to further the 
understanding of how cognitions influence behavior. Specifically, 
Bower suggests that emotions have powerful influences on memory, assoc-
iations, fantasies, social perceptions, snap judgments, and salience 
of mood congruous material. Differences in these cognitive processes, 
in turn, show up in differences in the behavior of depressed individuals. 
In sum, Bower's research has added supporting data and somewhat differ-
ent perspective to the previously discussed cognitive theories of 
depression. 
Two questions arise from this research. The first is one that 
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Bower has raised~ that is, do demand characteristLcs play a role in the 
findings? Bower (1981) reports a series of experiments (Bower & Vallone, 
cited in Bower, 1981; Stanislavski, 1936; Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979) 
which attempt to distinguish between automatic versus demand compliance 
interpretations of the data. Specifically, are the emotions evoked by 
hypnotism real and if they are, were the subjects responding naturally 
to the stimuli or were they responding to please the experimenter? 
Although research attempting to control for demand characteristics 
suggests that they do not play a role in the results, further research 
in which demand characteristics are not involved is suggested. A second 
question concerns the generalizability of Bower's results. Although the 
expected results are obtained by using experimentally induced moods, 
would naturally occurring moods found in the "real" world still have 
discernible effects on cognitive processes? To determine whether 
Bower's findings have relevance for understanding and treating depres-
sion in clinical settings, research with subjects showing varying 
degress of naturally-occurring depression is necessary. 
Gundersen (Note 1) extended the generalizability of Bower's 
findings by using subjects with varying degrees of naturally occurring 
depression. Specifically, Gundersen tested the affective recall of 
normal college subjects who varied on two tests measuring levels of 
depression. The recall of subjects who measured high (very depressed) 
on both the Beck Depression Inventory and the Multiscore Depression 
Inventory was compared to the recall of subjects who measured low on 
both inventories. When the ten subjects on each extreme were compared 
33 
significant differences in recall were found. Depressed subjects re-
membered more depressed words than happy subjects. No differences in 
amount of recall, ordering of recall, interjections into recall, or 
content of recall were found when all the subjects in both categories 
were used. It was hypothesized that college subjects did not vary 
enough in their levels of depression. Further testing of recall with 
clinically depressed and euphoric subjects is still necessary to add 
further data supporting Bower's premise relating cognition and emotion. 
The purpose of the present study was to replicate the Gundersen 
research using clinically depressed and euphoric subjects. Also, a 
partial replication of Bower et al. (1981) research in which subjects 
recalled happy, sad, and neutral incidents from a narrative, was done. 
Since the project used patients that were actually clinically depressed 
or euphoric instead of subjects hypnotized to be happy or sad, the 
generalizability of Bower's findings was studied. 
HYPOTHESES 
1. Affect of the subjects will be related to the affective content of 
what is recalled. 
a. Depressed subjects will remember more sad than happy words 
from the list and more sad than happy events from the story. 
b. Manic subjects will remember more happy than sad words from 
the list and more happy than sad incidents from the story. 
2. Mood will be related to subjects' ratings of the affect of words. 
a. Depressed subjects will rate the affect of words as sadder. 
b. Manic subjects will rate the affect of words as happier. 
3. Mood will be related to the total number of words or incidents 
recalled. 
a. Depressed subjects will recall less total number of words 
and less total incidents than manic subjects. 
4. Mood will be related to motivation in recall. 
a. Depressed subjects will recall more words than manic subjects 
after the experimenter prompts by asking if they wish to 
have more time for recall. 
5. Mood will be related to whether words a!e interjected into recall. 
a. Manic subjects will interject more words or incidents than 
depressed subjects. 
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6. Mood will be related to the nature of the words or incidents 
interjected. 
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a. Depressed subjects will interject more sad words or incidents. 
b. Manic subjects will interject more happy words or incidents. 
7. Mood will be related to the order of recall. 
8. 
a. Depressed subjects will remember sad words generally before 
the happy or neutral words. 
b. Manic subjects will rem.em ber the happy words generally before 
the neutral or sad words. 
Mood will be related to the nature of the chain associations to 
neutral words. 
a. Depressed subjects will chain associate more depressively to 
neutral words.· 
b. Manic subjects will chain associate more positively to neutral 
words. 
METHOD 
Subjects 
The subjects in this study were 40 patients taken from the acute 
psychiatry units of North Chicago Veteran's Administration Medical 
Center. They were divided into two groups based on their clinical 
diagnosis by the staff psychologist and their score on the Beck Depres-
sion Inventory. In order to be categorized as depressed, patients met 
the requirements for Major Depressive Episode or Dysthymic Disorder set 
forth in the Diagnostic Criteria from the DSM III. Some of the diagnos-
tic criteria included were: poor appetite or significant weight loss, 
insomnia or hypersomnia, psychomotor agitation or retardation, loss 
of energy, feelings of worthlessness or self-reproach, recurrent 
thoughts of death, etc. Patients placed in the depressed category also 
had a BDI score of 12 or above. To be categorized as manic for this 
research, the patients met the requirements for Xanic Episode set forth 
in the Diagnostic criteria from DSM III. Some of the diagnostic cri-
teria included were: increased activity, more talkative than usual, 
inflated self-esteem (grandiosity), decreased need for sleep, etc. 
Patients in the manic group all must have a score of less than 12 on 
the BDl. For both depressed and manic groups, no patient who was also 
exhibiting psychotic features was included. 
Materials 
Beck Depression Inventory. Subjects were given the Beck 
36 
37 
Depression Inventory (BDI: Beck, Ward, Mendelson, }bck, & Erbaugh, 
. 1961). The BDI is comprised of 21 items, each of which represents a 
discrete depressive symptom. Each item includes graded statements 
pertaining to the severity of the symptom. The examinees endorse the 
statement best matching their behavioral or-experimental state. An 
evaluation of the internal consistency of the BDI (Beck, 1967) resulted 
in a split-half reliability of .86 using the Pearson.£; with a Spear-
man Brown correction, this rose to • 93. The traditional test-retest 
method of assessing stability and consistency were not considered 
appropriate because the memory factor might inflate the score; however, 
an indirect method of estimating the stability of the instrument found 
that changes in the score of the inventory paralleled changes in clin-
ical ratings (made by psychiatrists) indicating a "consistent relation-
ship of the instruments to the patient's clinical state". (Beck, 196 7, 
p. 195). A concurrent validity of .75 was found in a. correlation 
between the BDI and the MMPI-D scale. Also, a validity score of .66 
was obtained between the BDI and the Depression Adjective Check List. 
Further measures of internal consistency, concurrent validity, and 
construct validity are available in Beck (1967). 
Stimulus Words. For the recall portion of this project a list of 
21 words (7 happy, 7 neutral, 7 sad) was used. The final lists were 
derived from a group of 100 adjectives which have been rated for their 
affective content. A group of 101 undergraduate psychology students 
rated the content of the adjectives as being: Very Sad, Sad, Neutral, 
Happy, Very Happy, or Not Applicable. Words were divided into 
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affective categories according to their ratings. Words which were 
described as either Sad or Very Sad at least 85% of the time were put 
in the Sad category; words which were rated as Neutral in their affec-
tive content at least 85% of the time were put into the Neutral cate-
gory; and words that were rated as Happy or Very Happy at least 85% 
of the time were put in the Happy category. Next, 7 words from each 
category were matched for frequency of use (Kucera & Francis, 1967) and 
put together to form the list of 21 words. For purposes of this study 
each word was printed on a 3" x 8" card in black magic marker and 
placed in random order. The list contains the following words: Miser-
able, Lucky, Steady, Destroyed, Tame, Thoughtful, Failure, Optimistic, 
Jovial, Tormented, Cheerful, Impartial, Mild, Neutral, Lively, Morbid, 
Discouraged, Energetic, Usual, Suffering, and Interested. Table 1 
explains which words were placed in each category. The experimenter 
recorded the number and order of the words recalled. 
For the association part of the experiment, 5 neutral words have 
been selected on the basis of their face validity. The words are: Life, 
Experience, Idea, Music, and Function. The words were placed on separ-
ate 4" x 9" sheets of paper. Each sheet had one word at the top and 
five lines below it where the associations were written. The five 
sheets for each subject will be stapled together with a cover sheet 
containing directions on the front. 
Story. All the patients read a 660-word fictitious narrative 
that described four sessions involving a male patient (Paul Smith, 
Happy Words 
Lucky 
Optimistic 
Jovial 
Cheerful 
Lively 
Energetic 
Interested 
TABLE 1 
Recall Words Divided According to Affect 
Neutral Words 
Steady 
Tame 
Thoughtful 
Impartial 
Mild 
Neutral 
Usual 
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Sad Words 
Miserable 
Destroyed 
Failure 
Tormented 
Morbid 
Discouraged 
Suffering 
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fictitious name) undergoing hypnotherapy with a psychiatrist. Except 
for brief statements giving the setting and describing the beginning 
and ending of the sessions, the narrative mainly depicts Paul recalling 
'and relating a carefully balanced variety of happy, neutral, and sad 
incidents from his life. The narrative was identical to the one used 
by Bower, Gilligan and Monteiro (1981) and is reproduced in Appendix A. 
It has been divided into 78 basic idea units which are further divided 
into 26 happy incidents, 26 neutral incidents, and 26 sad incidents. 
Examples of happy items are memories of riding piggyback on his 
father's back, being accepted at college, and attending holiday family 
gatherings, etc. Sad memories include the deaths of his grandfather 
and his dog, being cut from the baseball squad, and his sister's 
injuries in a car accident. Neutral items usually pertain to the 
setting information, the beginning of the trance or the ending of a 
trance at each session, and remarks between the doctor and Paul about 
his progress. 
Procedure 
Each subject was seen for approximately 45 minutes. Subjects were 
told that the experiment was studying "the effect of certain personality 
characteristics on cognitive processes." Secondly, subjects were given 
a consent form to read and sign (see Appendix B). Any questions were 
answered. The subjects were then asked to fill out a Beck Depression 
Inventory. Next, they were given the word association packet which 
had the following directions: "On each of the following pages, look 
at the typed word and write the first five words that word brings to 
mind." After the subjects were finished with the word associations, 
they were instructed: 
Next, I am going to show you 21 words, one at a time. When I 
finish, I would like to see how many words you can remember. 
Just recall as many as you can and I'll mark them down on 
this paper. No one can remember them all, just recall as many 
as you can. Any questions? Ready? 
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Each word was shown and verbalized to the subject one at a time at two-
second intervals. After the entire list was read and shown to the sub-
jects, they were asked to verbally recall as many as possible. After 
the subjects recalled as many as they could initially, the experimenter 
asked if they wished to have more time. Any additional words remembered 
were also recorded. When the task was completed, the subjects were 
allowed to look at the experimenter's list on which their responses 
were recorded. For the last task, subjects were given a copy of the 
narrative story and told, "Next I'm going to have you read this short 
story. Please read it very carefully because I am going to ask you to 
recall as much as you can about it when you are through. Ready?" 
After the story was read, subjects were asked to verbally recall as 
many details as possible while the experimenter wrote them down. 
RESULTS 
This study was designed to examine the relationship between 
affect and two cognitive processes, immediate recall and associations. 
A portion of the study was a replication of Bower, Gilligan, and MOn-
teiro's work (recalling events from a short story) using a clinical 
population. Specifically, eight major hypotheses were examined. They 
involved the relationship between: mood and the affective content of 
recall; mood and ratings of affective stimuli; affect and the total 
amount of recall including the role of motivation in recall; affect 
and the number and affective content of interjected stimuli; affect 
and the order of recall; and affect and associations to neutral words. 
The results are organized and presented as they apply to each hypoth-
esis. 
Mood and Affective Content of Recall 
Words. Table 2 presents the means and standard deviations of 
happy, neutral, and sad words remembered by all 40 of the manic and 
depressed subjects. An orderly visual trend is seen in the direction of 
the hypothesis. That is, manic subjects recalled an average of 2.50 
happy words and only 1.15 sad words. On the other hand, depressed 
subjects remembered only 1.30 happy words and 2.55 sad words. At both 
levels of mood, neutral words were remembered at lower rates than happy 
or sad words (manic= .50 words and depressed= .40 words). Not only 
does there appear to be an orderly progression within each level of 
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TABLE 2 
The Means and Standard Deviations of Happy, Neutral, 
and Sad Words Recalled for 20 Manic and 20 Depressed Subjects 
Words Recalled 
GROUP Happy Neutral Sad Total 
Manic 2.50 (1.43) .50 (. 61) 1.15 ( • 6 7) 4.15 (1.46) 
Depressed l. 30 ( .92) .40 (. 82) 2.55 ( • 95) 4.25 (1. 82) 
Average Words 
Recalled 1.90 (1.34) .45 (. 71) 1.85 (1. 08) 4.20 (1.52) 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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mood, there also appears to be expected results between each level of 
mood. That is, happy words seemed to be remembered on the average more 
often by manic subjects than depressed subjects (2.50 and 1.30, respec-
tively) and sad words seem to be recalled on the average more often by 
depressed subjects than manic subjects (2.55 and 1.15, respectively). 
A visual summary of these results is presented in Figure 1. 
Several analyses were done to determine the statistical signifi-
cance of the visual trend. A multivariate analysis for repeated 
measures showed there was a statistically significant difference due to 
the interaction between the affect of a subject (manic versus depressed) 
and the affect of the words recalled (happy or sad), Approx. Mult. I 
(2,37) = 17.595, £ < .0005. Planned univariate contrasts demonstrated 
that manics on the average recalled significantly more happy than sad 
words (2.50 and 1.15 words, respectively), !(1,76) = 19.675, £ <.0005, 
and depressives recalled on the average significantly more sad than 
happy words (2.55 and 1.30 words, respectively), f(l,76) = 16.868, £ < 
.0005. There was also a multivariate statistically significant differ-
ence due to the affect of the words recalled, Approx. Mult. f(2,37) = 
40.505, £ <.0005. Specifically, multivariate contrasts of the average 
number of words recalled by affect across groups showed that neutral 
words were remembered significantly less often than happy or sad words, 
t = -5.45582, £ <.0005. 
In sum, mood was significantly related to the affect of words 
recalled. Depressives remembered more sad than happy words while manics 
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Figure 1. Comparing the Affective Content and Total Recall 
(for Words) of a Group of 20 Manic Subjects With 
the Recall of a Group of 20 Depressed .Subjects 
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recalled more happy than sad words. On the whole, neutral words were 
remembered less often than either happy or sad words across groups. 
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Events. Table 3 presents the mean number of happy, neutral, and 
sad events which subjects recalled from the short story. Again, an 
orderly visual trend is seen in the direction of the hypothesis. Manic 
subjects recalled an average of 2.90 happy events and 2.55 sad events 
while depressed subjects remembered on the average only 1.95 happy 
events and 3.60 sad events. There also appears to be an orderly pro-
gression between mood levels. That is, happy events seemed to be 
remembered on the average more often by manic subjects than depressed 
subjects (2.90 events and 1.95 events, respectively) and sad events 
seemed to be remembered on the average more often by depressed subjects 
than manic subjects (3.60 and 2.55 events, respectively). See Figure 
~ for a visual presentation. 
Statistically, multivariate analyses of variance demonstrated there 
is a significant interaction of group and affect of events recalled, 
Approx. Mult. f(2,37) = 4.822, £ = .014. Specifically, planned uni-
variate contrasts showed that depressives remembered significantly more 
sad than happy events, f(l,76) = 12.910, £ = .001; however, contrasts 
between the number of happy and sad events recalled by manics was not 
significant, f(l,76) = .5809, ~· There was also a significant main 
effect for the affect of the events recalled, Approx. Mult. f(2,37) = 
6.3655, £ = .004. The multivariate contrast showed that across groups, 
the number of neutral events recalled compared to the number of happy 
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TABLE 3 
The Means and Standard Deviations of Happy, Neutral, 
and Sad Events Recalled for 20 Manic and 20 Depressed Subjects 
Events Recalled 
GROUP Happy Neutral Sad Total 
Manic 2.90 (1. 86) 2.10 (1. 92) 2.55 (2.72) 7.55 (5.69) 
Depressed 1. 95 (2.06) 1. 70 (1.56) 3.60 (2.35) 7.25 (4. 76) 
Average Events 
Recalled 2.43 (1.99) 1.90 (1.74) 3.08 (2.57) 7.40 (5.18) 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
Average 
Number of Events 
Recalled 
8 
7 
6 
5 
4 
Happy 
Events 
Neutral 
Events 
Sad 
Events 
Total 
Events 
Note. Striped bar is manic group; block bar is depressed group. 
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the Recall of a Group of 20 Depressed Subjects 
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or sad events was significant, ~ = -3.050, ~ =.004. In sum, a rela-
tionship between mood and the affect of events recalled was demon-
strated. 
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All in all, the hypothesis suggesting a relationship between mood 
and affective content of recall was strongly supported. Manics remem-
bered significantly more happy words and events than depressives, 
while depressives recalled significantly more depressed words and 
events than manics. In both subtests, a main effect for affect was 
also demonstrated. Neutral words and events across groups were on the 
average recalled significantly less often than words and events with 
extreme affective values. 
Mood and Ratings of Stimuli 
To control for variability in individual subjects' personal 
reactions to the affective content of each stimulus word, the subjects 
rated each of the 21 words on a five-point graphic rating scale (a 
Likert scale) for affect level. The subject was assigned a 1 if the 
word was rated as "very sad," and 2 if the word was "sad," a 3 if the 
word was "neutral," a 4 if the word was "happy," or a 5 if the word 
was rated as "very happy." It was observed that in no case did any 
subject assign an affect value which was extremely opposite to the 
affect value which was expected. For example, in no case was a word 
which was prerated and assigned to the happy group of words_ rated as 
"sad" or "very sad" by an individual. To observe possible group differ-
ences in affective ratings of stimulus words, each of the 21 ratings 
was summed up to yield a single score for each subject, an overall 
rating of the affect of the words. This overall rating of each sub-
ject was analyzed in a one-way analysis of variance to see if there 
was any difference in the overall mean totaled ratings of manics or 
depressed subjects. The manic subjects rated the 21 words with a mean 
total score of 64.35 and a standard deviation of 2.72, while the de-
pressed subjects rated the words with a mean total score of 59.80 and 
a standard deviation of 4.11. This difference is statistically signi-
ficant, F(l,38) = 17.036, £ =.0002. In sum, the manic subjects' 
totaled ratings of the stimulus words were more positive than those of 
the depressed subjects. 
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In sum, the hypothesis relating mood to affective ratings of 
stimuli was solidly supported. Manics rated the stimuli generally more 
positively than did depressives. Differences between the groups were 
demonstrated by summing up ratings across 21 words to yield a single 
totaled score for each subject. 
Affect and Total Recall 
Words. Table 2 showed that manic subjects remembered an average 
of 4.15 words and depressed subjects remembered an average of 4.25 
words. A multivariate analysis of variance using repeated measures was 
conducted to assess the difference in the mean total number of happy, 
neutral, and sad words recalled by manic and depressed subjects. There 
was no statistically significant difference between the mean total 
number of words recalled by manic subjects and the mean total number of 
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words recalled by depressed subjects, !(1,38) = .042, ns. 
In anticipation of demonstrating differences in the total recall 
between manics and depressives, a control for motivation in the form 
of a prompt was introduced. After subjects had initially responded by 
recalling as many words as they could, they were encouraged to take as 
much time as they needed to recall any more words that may come to 
mind. The number of words recalled after the prompt was recorded for 
each subject. For both manic and depressed groups the mean number of 
words recalled after the prompt was identical, .55 with standard devia-
tions of .999 and .887 words, respectively. No difference in the aver-
age number of words recalled after prompting demonstrated that the two 
groups were not stati~tically different so no further analysis was 
done. 
Events. The results for the total nUmber of events recalled are 
similar to those for the total number of words recalled. Table 3 
showed that manic subjects remembered an average of 7.55 events while 
depressed subjects recalled an average of 7.25 events. An analysis of 
variance demonstrated there was no significant difference in the mean 
total number of events recalled by manic and depressed subjects, !(1,38) 
= .03274, ns. No prompting measure was recorded for events. 
In sum, the hypothesis relating affect to total recall was not 
statistically supported in either measure of recall (total words or 
total events remembered). Furthermore, the hypothesis suggesting that 
mood would be related to motivation in recall was not supported. Both 
manic and depressed groups remembered a small but equal mean number 
of words after prompting. 
Affect and Interjected Stimuli 
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Words. A one-way analysis of variance predicting the number of 
words interjected from affect showed no difference in the mean number 
of interjected words for manic versus depressed subjects. The manic 
group added on the average 1.05 words while the depressed subjects 
added on the average 0.65 words. The difference was not statistically 
significant, !(1,38) = 1.136, ~· 
Table 4 shows the mean number and affect of interjected words for 
manic and depressed subjects. While the numbers are small, there 
appears to be a within group effect. Manic subjects interject on the 
average .85 happy words and only on the average .10 sad words, while 
depressed subjects interjected an average of only .05 happy words and 
.60 sad words. A between-groups effect also appears evident. Manics 
remember on the average more happy words than depressives (.85 and .05, 
respectively), while depressives interject more sad words than manics 
(.60 and .10 words, respectively). Figure 3 presents these results 
visually. Statistically, there was a significant Multivarial F for 
groups, Approx. Mult. !(3,36) = 4.656, £ = .008. The manic subjects 
interjected more happy words than depressed subjects, !(1,76) = 11.676, 
£ = .001 and depressed subjects interjected more sad words than manic 
subjects, !(1,76) = 9.811, £ = .002. The univariate F for neutral words 
interjected was not significant, !(1,38) = 2.111, ~· In sum, although 
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TABLE 4 
The Means and Standard Deviations of Happy, Neutral, 
and Sad Words Interjected by 20 Manic and 20 Depressed Subjects 
Words Added 
GROUP Happy Neutral Sad Total 
Manic .85 (1. 39) .10 ( . 31) .10 ( .31) 1.05 (1.50) 
Depressed .05 ( .22) 0.00 (0.00) .60 (.75) .65 ( • 75) 
Average Words 
Added • 45 (1. 06) • 05 ( • 22) • 35 (. 62) .85 (1.19) 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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Figure 3. The Content and Number of Word Interjected Into 
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affect was not related to the amount of words interjected into recall, 
affect was related to the affective value of words interjected when the 
value was extreme. 
Events. Table 5 shows the mean number of events interjected by 
depressed and manic groups. Very few events were interjected. The 
manic subjects added an average of .40 total events while the depressed 
subjects added an average of .05 events. This difference was not sig-
nificantly different, !(1,38) = 1.39, ~· Due to the fact that the 
means in the data were so small and some of the variables had no vari-
ance, a statistical analysis to determine the relationship between mood 
and affect of events was inappropriate. A visual trend, however, was 
suggestive of a relationship similar to that found previously between 
mood and affect of words interjected. 
In sum, the hypothesis relating affect to the number of words in-
terjected was not supported. Neither words interjected into the recall 
list nor events interjected into recall of the short story could be 
predicted from the mood of the subjects. On the other hand, there was 
support for the hypothesis relating mood and the affect of stimuli 
interjected. Manic subjects interjected significantly more happy than 
sad words and depressed subjects interjected more sad than happy words 
into the recalled list. Although a statistical analysis was not done, 
a similar visual trend was apparent between subjects' mood and the 
affect of events interjected. 
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TABLE 5 
The Means and Standard Deviations of Happy, Neutral, 
and Sad Events Interjected by 20 Manic and 20 Depressed Subjects 
Events Added 
GROUP Happy Neutral Sad Total 
Manic .3 (0.92) 0.0 (0. 0) .10 (.31) .4 (. 99) 
Depressed 0.0 (0. 00) 0.0 (0. 0) • OS ( .22) • OS (. 22) 
Average 
Events Added .15 ( .66) 0.0 (0.0) . 08 (. 27) • 23 (. 73) 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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Affect and Order of Recall 
To analyze the order of the words remembered, the recalled words 
were divided into three groups, the first third of the words recalled, 
the second third of the words recalled, and the last third of the 
words recalled for each subject. Sad words were rated as 1, neutral 
words were rated as 2, and happy words were rated as 3. The average 
level of affect in each of the three word groups was computed and the 
results are shown on Table 6. A repeated measures multivariate analysis 
of variance testing for the order of recall within subjects was not 
significant, !(3,38) = .03834, ~· That is, across manic and depressed 
subjects, there was no difference in the average affect of words re-
called in the first, second, and third groups (1.866, 1.835, and 1.879, 
respectively). Next, a multivariate analysis of variance testing for 
the interaction of group by order of recall was done. There were no 
significant interaction effects, Approx. Mult. !(3,36) = 1.56435, ns. 
In sum, the hypothesis relating mood and the affective order of 
recall was not supported. There were no significant differences in 
tests for order of recall across manic and depressed subjects or in 
tests for the interaction of group by order of recall. 
Affect and Chain Association 
To test the hypothesis that mood influences chain associations to 
neutral stimuli, a procedure similar to Bower's was used. Two judges 
independently rated the subjects' chain associations as made by either 
a manic or depressed person. The criterion used to determine whether 
TABLE 6 
Means and Standard Deviations for Affect Ratings of Three Groups of 
Words in the Order Remembered by 20 Manic and 20 Depressed Subjects 
GROUP First 
Manic 2.35 (.71) 
Depressed 1.38 (.68) 
Average 
Group Rating 1.87 (.84) 
Affect Ratings 
Second Third Average Total 
2.09 (.93) 2.32 (.92) 2.25 (.85) 
1.58 (.69) 1.44 (.81) 1.47 (.74) 
1.84 (.85) 1.88 (.96) 1.86 (.86) 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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the associations were influenced by mood was the judges' ability to 
correctly differentiate the affective state of the individual who made 
the associations. Interjudge reliability as determined by their inde-
pendent ratings of sample chain associations was 90%. Table 7 summar-
izes the judges' ratings of the chain associations. The judges were 
accurately able to identify the chain associations of manic subjects 
an average of 87.5% of the time and depressed subjects 85% of the time. 
A chi square using the obtained and theoretical frequencies was signi-
ficant, Chi Square (1) = 10.525, £ <.005. The judges were rating the 
associations at a significantly different from chance level. Manic 
subjects chain associated to neutral words in an observably different 
way than depressed s•.1bj ects. 
In sum, the hypothesis suggesting a relationship between affec-
tive state and chain associations to neutral words was supported. Manic 
and depressed subjects chain associate to neutral words in observably 
different ways. 
RATERS 
Judge 1 
Judge 2 
Average 
Rating 
TABLE 7 
Correct Ratings of Chain Word Associations 
Into Either Depressed or Manic Groups 
Correct Ratings 
Manic Depressed Average 
17 17 17 
18 17 17.5 
17.5 17 17.25 
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DISCUSSION 
The preceding research was based on the premi~e that mood is re-
lated to cognitive processes such as immediate recall and associations. 
In general, strong support was shown for several of the hypotheses 
associated with this premise. Specifically, relationships between: 
mood and the affective content of recall, mood and the affective con-
tent of interjected stimuli, mood and ratings of stimuli, and affect and 
associations to neutral words, were demonstrated to be significant. 
In cases in which two tests of the hypothesized relationship (word and 
event recall tasks) were done, they showed similar results and in no 
case were contradictory. No support was provided for hypotheses regard-
ing the relationship between: mood and total amount of recall, includ-
ing the role of motivation in recall, mood and the number of words 
interjected into recall, and mood and affective order of recall. 
These results are consistent with the general premises of cognitive 
theories of depression which propose differences in the cognitive pro-
cesses between depressed and nondepressed individuals. Beck (1972) 
showed that depressed subjects selectively abstract the unpleasant 
aspects of their experience which suggests the possibility of selective 
memory. Roth (1977) did not find support for selective memory in sub-
jects but did find evidence of selective attention to mood-congruent 
aspects of their own behavior. Additionally, Rehm (1977) suggested 
possible selective memory and attention as reasons for differences in 
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self-monitoring and self-evaluation between depressed and nondepressed 
subjects. The present study supported the work of these cognitive 
theorists by demonstrating mood-congruent recall and associations in 
both depressed and manic subjects. 
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These results are also consistent with Bower's work which showed 
differences in cognitive processes relative to subject mood. Specif-
ically, the data supporting the hypothesis relating mood and affective 
content of recall is consistent with Bower's preliminary work (Bower, 
1980; Bower, Gilligan, & Monteiro, 1981) using subjects hypnotized to 
emulate happy and sad states. Portions of the present research par-
tially replicated Bower, Gilligan, and Monteiro (1981) in which hypno-
tized subjects read and recalled events from a short story in which the 
main character described many unrelated happy and sad incidents in his 
life. In addition to showing a relationship between cognition and 
affect consistent with previous research, the present research found 
these differences using the extreme mood levels found in a clinical 
population of manic and depressed subjects. Some of the earlier reser-
vations of previous researchers concerning the need to strongly manipu-
late the subjects' mood to obtain results, the "realness" of the mood 
induced, possible demand characteristics resulting from evident mood 
inducement, and generalizability of previous lab findings are minimized 
by this design. 
The present research furthered Bower's preliminary work in a 
second way. This research demonstrated that it was not necessary to 
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·use happy and sad events to show cognitive differences in happy and sad 
individuals. Words with affectively laden contents are also effective. 
In most cases in which word tests of recall were used in addition to 
event tests of recall (specifically affective content of recall, total 
recall, amount and type of interjections into recall), the results 
were consistent. In fact, statistical analyses done on the word recall 
tasks showed greater degrees of significance than statistical analyses 
completed on the event recall tasks. One discrepancy was noted when 
comparing a univariate contrast for the word task with a contrast for 
the event recall task. The explanation for this specific discrepancy 
will be discussed later. The word task may be more sensitive to mood 
influence because it is less accurately recalled than the event recall 
task. Across manics and depressives, an average of 7.40 events were 
remembered as opposed to only 4.20 words. More accurate recall for 
events was also shown by the amount of words and events interjected 
into recall. Subjects were less likely to interject additional events 
into the story than additional words to the list (.175 events added and 
.85 words added, respectively). In sum, the present research success-
fully used word recall tasks as well as event recall tasks to demon-
strate a relationship between mood and content of recall. It was 
additionally suggested that tasks involving word recall may be more 
sensitive in demonstrating mood differences than tasks involving event 
recall. 
The results of this study were also consistent with several hypoth-
eses proposed in Gundersen's research (Note 1) which used words as the 
recall stimuli. First, that study hypothesized that cognitive differ-
ences shown by college students with a range of depressed to nonde-
pressed moods were not different enough. The same procedure used in 
the present study with a clinical population did demonstrate cognitive 
differences between manics and depressives for content of recall, con-
tent of interjections, affective ratings of stimuli, and chain assoc-
iations to neutral words. 
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A second hypothesis suggested in Gundersen's preliminary research, 
the importance of prerating affective content of the stimuli, was firmly 
established in the present project by a close examination of the one 
case of discrepant results (between the event and word task) mentioned 
earlier. A univariate contrast on the word task showed that manics 
remembered significantly more happy than sad words while a similar con-
trast on an event recall task, surprisingly, did not. Additionally, a 
contrast showing the number of happy versus sad events recalled 
approached significance, ~ = 1.9843, ~ =.054. That is, sad events 
provided a stronger stimuli for recall than happy events regardless 
of subject mood. The discrepant results may be due to a stimulus con-
found; even though the happy events were mood-congruent for manics, 
the sad events provided stronger stimuli, perhaps by being more affec-
tively extreme. This discrepancy may be due to the fact that the 
affective content of the events was not prerated and counterbalanced as 
were the words. Upon scrutiny, the sad events in the story appear to 
have a more extreme affect value than do the happy events (grandfather 
dying, attendance at grandmother's funeral, and mother developing cancer 
versus holiday family gatherings, being with first girlfriend, and 
being accepted in college). Since no such main effect is evident in 
the word recall task, it is plausible to hypothesize that differences 
in recall of events across groups is related to possible differences 
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in the average affect values for happy and sad events in the story. 
With this in mind, suggestions for future research would include using 
stimuli which were prerated into several affective levels (very happy 
stimuli, happy stimuli, neutral stimuli, sad stimuli, and very sad 
stimuli). Subjects could also be rated and divided into groups of an 
equal number of mood levels. This would allow the researcher to ob-
serve if subjects selectively learned material most congruent to their 
affective state or material which was more extreme than (but still con-
gruent to) their affective state. Subjects' mood level could be 
measured after the task to determine if their affective state had de-
creased, maintained, or increased intensity. 
Some of the hypotheses in this project were not supported by the 
data. Specifically, the unsupported hypotheses included those regarding 
a relationship between mood and: the total amount of recall including 
the role of motivation in recall, the amount of interjections into 
recall, and the affective order of recall. There are several explana-
tions for these phenomena. One explanation for no differences between 
manics and depressives on these measures is that there actually are no 
cognitive differences of these kinds between the two groups. An alter-
native explanation for the total recall similarities and the similarities 
in the number of interjections between both groups, as well as the 
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seemingly useless prompt measure may be the extremely low motivational 
level of the typical veteran's administration psychiatric population. 
The low number of responses recorded for all three measures is sugges-
tive of a broad-based low level of motivation which could effectively 
mask any real recall differences of this type between groups. Although 
the results did not support these additional hypotheses and alternative 
explanations have been suggested, the data are not inconsistent with 
Bower's preliminary research on mood and cognitive processes. 
More theoretically, this research provides additional support 
for Bower's notion of the associative network theory of memory and 
emotion, i.e., emotion serves as a memory unit that can enter into 
associations with events. It assumes that by spreading activation, a 
dominant emotion will enhance the salience of congruent stimulus mater-
ials for learning, therefore also increasing the likelihood of mood 
congruent material at the time of recall. In this project, subjects 
learned and therefore recalled more materials (events and words) which 
were congruent with their emotional state than materials which were 
incongruent to their emotional state. Mood congruent recall is consis-
tent with Bower's network theory of emotion and memory. The positive 
relationship between the specific intensity of the mood congruent mater-
ial and the extent of recall suggests that material which is extreme 
in affect value is more memorable because while it is minimally resis-
tant to or serves to heighten one's affective state, it may also be a 
less common event therefore having less associations to other (possibly 
inhibiting) stimuli. More neutral stimuli may be remembered less often 
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because in addition to not exclusively being paired with the subject's 
current mood state, they are likely used in several other associative 
networks and therefore less distinguishable to remember. Hypotheses 
suggested by previous researchers suggesting mood-congruence recall is 
effective because it justifies the subject's state or because it re-
minds the subjects of an event in their own lives are not valid here 
because the subjects were not hypnotized (so had no need to justify 
their state) and the stimuli was not always in the form of events (to 
serve as cues for the subject's own memory). 
In addition to supporting Bower's associative network of emotion 
and memory (reactive cognitive processes), the results of this project 
support the relationship between mood and active cognitive productions. 
Bower, Gilligan, and Monteiro (1982) demonstrate that although differ-
ences between the cognitions of happy and sad subjects show up in 
recall, cognitive differences actually occur during the active process 
of learning, probably in the form of selective attention to mood con-
gruous material. In addition to mood being related to cognitive reac-
tions to material more properly demonstrated by differences in affec-
tive ratings of material, that is, reactions to emotionally laden mater-
ial, mood is also related to active cognitive productions. Active 
processes such as selective attention as demonstrated by differential 
content of recall, material production as demonstrated by content of 
words interjected, and associative thought processes as demonstrated by 
associations to neutral words were shown. In sum, the results of this 
study emphasize the aspect of the associative network theory that 
relates mood to active cognitive productions forming a theoretical 
framework for examining active thought processes as well as forming 
a framework for examining memory. 
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In addition to its support of a theoretical framework, the re-
sults of this research may have some clinical relevance as well. Al-
though the results for the present project are primarily statistically 
significant rather than clinically observable it may be relevant for 
the clinician to understand that patients' thought processes are closely 
linked to their present mood. This may be observably or statistically 
demonstrated several possible ways in the therapy setting. First, when 
clients are presented with several pieces of information (whether it 
be interpretations, alternative ways of viewing or dealing with a sit-
uation, or feedback) material which is mood congruent may be more sal-
ient therefore more easily learned and remembered by the client. In 
addition, extremely affect-laden (mood-congruent) material is more 
likely to be selectively attended to and recalled than more neutral 
material. Secondly, when asked to actively produce material (alterna-
tive ways of viewing and dealing with situations), clients may have a 
tendency to produce alternatives within a limited affective range, i.e., 
mood-congruent productions. A third way in which the results of this 
study may relate to client behavior in a clinical setting is an emotion-
al bias in associations. Manic and depressed patients chain associated 
to neutral moods in observably different ways, the associations being 
closely linked with the mood of the patient. It is not currently known 
if this bias is observable when associations are made to mood-congruent 
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and mood-incongruent as well as neutral material. In addition to being 
aware of these chaining biases in therapy settings, it may be possible 
to use chain associations to neutral words, since they are clinically 
identifiable over 85% of the time, as additional projective measures of 
affective states for diagnostic purposes and serially as a measure of 
clinical improvement. In sum, the results of the present research al-
though primarily statistically rather than clinically observable, show 
possibilities for relevant use in clinical settings. 
On a broader spectrum, this study contributes to the literature 
on theories of depression and depressive behavior. Research such as 
this which observe specific relationships between mood and measures of 
selective learning, memory, and associations, highlight the complex 
relationship between affect and cognitions. The results of this study 
contributed to a theoretical framework which can form the basis for 
clinical assessment and intervention in the future. 
SUMMARY 
This study investigated the relationship petween mood and two 
cognitive processes, immediate recall and word associations. Specif-
ically, the study looked at the relationship between the mood of manic 
and depressed individuals in a Veteran's Administration psychiatric 
population and the content of affect-laden recall, affective ratings 
of stimuli, amount of total recall, amount and content of interjections, 
ordering of recall, and chain associations to neutral words. Manic 
and depressed subjects were required to verbally recall stimuli from 
a list of 21 affect-laden words, recall affect-laden events from a 
short story, and chain associate to five neutral words. A significant 
relationship was found between mood and affective content of recall, 
content of interjections, ratings of stimuli, and chain associations. 
The task requiring the recall of affect-laden words appeared even more 
sensitive to the mood of the subject than the event recall task. The 
importance of prerating and counterbalancing the affective content of 
the stimuli was stressed. The results of this study provided strong 
support for preliminary resaerch on mood and cognitive processes and 
for Bower's associative network theory of emotion and memory which 
conceptualizes emotion as a memory unit affecting cognitions. Specif-
ically, the results supported Bower's theory involving mood-congruous 
memory and the active cognitive processes of selective attention ar.d 
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mood-congruous associations. Implications of these results for cogni-
tive theories of depression and for future clinical use were discussed. 
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Paul Smith 
Paul Smith had been seeing a psychiatrist for several sessions 
now. They had been making some progress together, but Paul's ambiva-
lence in certain areas of his experience still remained prominent. The 
psychiatrist had suggested hypnotic age regression sessions as a pos-
sible therapeutic modality for him, so Paul had agreed. 
The first trance experience uncovered some interesting childhood 
experiences. At the age of 4, Paul remembered the happiness of playing 
with his family at home. He recalled the glee and fascination when 
he rode piggyback on his father's back, seeing the broad smile glisten-
ing on his mother's face, and the joyous laugh of his father's voice in 
the background. He also recalled some sad experiences at this early 
age. He recalled the overwhelming sadness when his dog was run over by 
a car; his grief at his grandfather's death; and the despair of 
watching a hard-earned quarter slip through the grating of the sewer. 
He also recalled the giggles of his sibling as they lay awake at night 
telling jokes, the happiness of his grandmother's face at his birthday 
party, and the delight and joy present at holidy family gatherings. 
In the second age regression he went back to his years in grammar 
school. He recalled the sadness in being cut from his baseball team, 
and the glumness encountered upon resignedly realizing the inevitability 
of a return visit to the dreaded dentist. He also remembered the joy 
and excitement in learning to spell his name properly, and the jubila-
tion of receiving the top grade in his class. Additionally recalled 
was the dismal and cheerless memory of staying inside on a gloomy, rainy 
day, and his crestfallen stature upon receiving news of his sister's 
auto accident. The session concluded with a termination of the trance, 
and a brief discussion of the significance of the past events to the 
present situation. 
With the arrival of the third hypnosis session, the psychiatrist 
informed Paul that he was relatively happy with the therapeutic pro-
gress. Paul, in return, stated he could feel happy, and that he could 
also feel sad. An age regression trance to adolescent years was then 
effected. In this trance, Paul recalled the happiness which enveloped 
him when he was blissfully with his first girlfriend; he also sadly 
remembered her family moving to another town. He re-experienced the 
elation in scoring high on his SAT test, and the fantastic joy of being 
accepted in college. Other memories included the sadness of departing 
from his high school friend, and his sorrowful attendance at his grand-
mother's funeral. These experiences were interspersed with others that 
included a jubilant back-packing outing in the mountains, a fun-filled 
beer party with his close friends, and a despair-filled evening that 
resulted from a sorrowful rejection by a steady date. After several 
hours, the trance session was terminated and Paul left with a mixture 
of feelings. 
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He arrived somewhat depressed for the next session, but reported 
he had been generally happy during the week. After brief casual con-
versation, an age regression trance was once again utilized. The 
memories recalled in this session involved Paul's early teenage years. 
He remembered the elation in hearing his first rock and roll album and 
the high he felt in going to his first rock concert. He also recalled 
the despondency experienced in hearing rumors of the breakup of the 
Beatles, the despair of not obtaining tickets to a Rolling Stones con-
cert, and the sadness in discovering a warp in a newly purchased double 
album. Other memories quickly flashed through his awareness: the 
delight of meeting an old friend, the jubilation of a last-second vic-
tory in a football game, and the hilarious performance of a stage 
comedian in a night club. The thoughts continued at a quick but natur-
al rate: The flunking of an important final exam; the grief in his 
best friend's voice when he informed Paul of his rejection by college 
admissions committees; the remorsefulness after losing his allowance; 
and the overwhelming sorrow in hearing his mother had developed cancer. 
Paul experienced himself as a passive but involved observer to these 
fleeting incidents. However, as the session ended, he knew a shift 
inside of him had occurred. He walked out of the office in deep inter-
nal p~ocesses. 
When Paul returned to the office s~veral days later, he was in the 
same state as when he left the last session. They discussed the various 
outcomes of the age regression sessions, and decided that the therapeutic 
investigation would continue, but no longer using hypnosis. 
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Information about: Relationship between affect and two cognitive 
processes: ~ediate recall and associations. 
Principal Investigator: Gerald Rak., Ph.D., Phone: (312) 689-1900 
This study wishes to investigate the relationship between feeling 
and thought processes, specifically immediate recall and associations. 
I understand that if I am chosen to be a participant in this study that 
I will be asked to complete a short paper and pencil test called the 
Beck Depression Inventory. I know that I will be assigned to one of 
two groups. Then I will be asked to complete two short recall tasks 
and an association task. This process generally takes about a half an 
hour. I may be asked to retake one o,f the recall tasks and the assoc-
iation task again before I am tr,ansferred off triage. 
•' 
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There are no known adverse effects to participating in this study. 
The benefits of this study may be the increased knowledge concerning 
the relationship between feeling and thought processes. I know that 
others may benefit from the knowledge gained from this investigation. 
The proposed experimental procedure has been explained to me. 
I understand that I am free to ~thdraw my consent and discontinue 
participati~n in this study at any time without prejudice to my con-
tinued status as a triage patient or treatment received. Although the 
results of this study may be published in the psychological literature, 
my identity will not be disclosed. If I have any questions concerning 
the procedure outlined above or any aspect of the study they will be 
answered for me. 
I have read the above and understand it and hereby consent to the 
procedures set forth above. 
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